# The Great Power Consensus on Nonproliferation is Fraying: What Should be Done?

[00:01:00] Speaker 2: Ladies and gentlemen, please welcome to the stage Sarah Bidgood, Kazuko Hikawa, Joelien Pretorius, and Daniel Kooij.

[00:01:34] Speaker 3: Very good. Thank you so much. Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, welcome back after the great break and I would say inspiring keynote by Mariano Grossi. A lot of things to think about, which also relates to the question that we deal with today. Thank you to Carnegie for convening this panel on the challenging topic, the great power consensus on non-proliferation is fraying, what should be done? The context of our panel today takes historical root in the Cold War and even though the first UN General Assembly resolution in 1946 established a commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy, an increasing fear of the spread of the atomic weapon or the atomic bomb to more and more states grew among the international community during the late 1950s. And as one of the tensest moments in the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 instilled the understanding that international agreements were needed to manage competition and avoid nuclear risk. Perhaps the most significant of this agreement was the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which I will refer to as the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. From this moment on, the NPT initiated a movement which diminished the role of nuclear weapons in international security while maintaining strategic stability of which we reap the benefits today. Primarily, the NPT sets a clear norm against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear weapon state and it did so by resolving a collective action problem. Participants forego acquiring nuclear weapons given reasonable assurances that their neighbours or adversaries do so as well. And from this perspective, one could say that the NPT is a security agreement that delivers every day. After the NPT's implementation in 1970, the number of nuclear weapons came down from a high point of around 70,000 to the current numbers of around 12,000 during the second half of the 80s. In other words, during the Cold War. And maybe that could provide us with some hope. Nevertheless, one could say that the relatively positive trend has slowed down or even has been reversed in the recent years with increasing vertical and horizontal proliferation. But another example also is the politicisation of the NPT through the blocking by one nuclear weapon state party to the NPT review conference outcome document in 2022. Non-proliferation is hence under pressure, leading us to the panel discussion here today. Please allow me to introduce the three experts we have here today and a great thanks to Carnegie for bringing them together with I think very distinguished experiences and also opinions so that should lead to a good panel. Let me start with Dr Sarah Bidgood, a postdoctoral fellow from the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation with expertise on US-Soviet and US-Russian relations and collaboration even on arms control and non-proliferation. Next, Dr Hikawa, Vice Director and Professor at the Research Centre for Nuclear Weapons Abolition at Nagasaki University. Dr Hikawa has contributed to and played a role in numerous international and proliferation forums. And third, Dr Joelien Pretorius, Professor in and as well as Head of the Department of Political Studies at the University of Western Cape in South Africa. Her expertise lies, amongst others, in shaping a nuclear-free world. Now, to further elaborate on the format of the panel, which you're by now acquainted to, we have about 60 minutes in total. And for the first panel, I would pose one opening question to each of the panelists and then open it to Q&As from the room, which you can put in the app and I will see here on the screen. To start with the first, Dr Bidput, much of your work focuses on US-Soviet

and US-Russian relations on arms control. Could you share with us some key lessons about the way that successful collaboration at that time took shape between the US and USSR-Russia and how these insights could be applied to revive a possible great power collaboration in today's geopolitical environment?

**[00:06:49] Speaker 4:** Thank you so much. Thank you, Daniel. Thank you for the question. Thank you to the organizers. It's great to be back. As you said in your question, the United States and the Soviet Union did often work very closely together on a whole range of nuclear issues, nonproliferation, arms control, etc., including at some of the most challenging moments of the Cold War. And if you look at the historical record, as my colleagues and I have done, you can see that there are a lot of reasons for that, which I hope we can discuss on this panel. But I'll just highlight two that I think are particularly instructive to get our conversation going. So one is that the United States and the Soviet Union often saw fit to cooperate on issues where they perceived a mutual threat and determined that they were better off working on that threat together than separately. And just to give you an example here that I think is particularly illustrative, when the United States and the Soviet Union were forming the Nuclear Suppliers Group, for example, their motivation was the fact that they appreciated, particularly after India's peaceful nuclear explosion, that they needed sort of stricter conditions of supply, but they also understood that they couldn't do that unilaterally because there were market forces at play that would make that disadvantageous for either one of them. So they decided to work together. The second insight that comes through when you look at that record is how important interpersonal relations were between American and Soviet officials at a working level. And I think the best example here, of course, and I see Matt Bunn is here, is between George Bunn and Roland Timurbayev, who interacted very closely and developed, I would say, quite a friendship in their interactions in Geneva at the ENDC, which really gave them sort of the respect, the mutual trust, to think creatively and to take risks in overcoming some of the obstacles that emerged in the context of negotiating the Nonproliferation Treaty, to which you referred. Now, in a lot of ways, both of these factors for success came about as a result of close and frequent interaction between Americans and Soviets on a whole range of issues, really between about 1975 all the way through the end of the Cold War. And through these interactions, individuals on both sides were able to get a better sense for the perceived threats of their adversaries, but also to develop that personal trust and rapport that it turns out was so important for driving and sustaining cooperation. So if we're thinking about lessons for today, one that comes to mind, and I realize this may seem a little bit like putting the cart before the horse, is that we really need to start reviving this regular cooperation between Russians and Americans. And the challenge for us, of course, is that we don't have the bilateral fora to do that right now. We don't have a strategic stability dialogue. We don't have an active bilateral consultative commission. And so what that means for us is that we really need to put an emphasis on maintaining and preserving the existing multilateral disarmament and nonproliferation regime so that those interactions can take place on the margins. Now, none of that is going to matter, and this is the last point I make before I'll turn it back over to you, Daniel, is that if you don't have buy-in at the top, none of the things I've just said are going to matter. And so political will here is really fundamentally important. The good news, I guess, is that Trump does seem to be fairly interested in engaging in some sort of nuclear cooperation with Putin. We don't really have a lot of indications that that is being reciprocated. It sounds like there are thoughts on the Russian side that that will be pretty challenging. But at least that tees us up to have a

conversation about the potential for that resumed interaction. And whether that actually comes to pass, we'll have to see. I'll turn it back to you. Thanks.

**[00:10:17] Speaker 3:** Thank you so much. I'd like to continue with the second speaker. Dr. Hikawa, you have extensive diplomatic experience in the International Nonproliferation Forum. What implications do you have, do you think fraying great power commitment to nonproliferation would have for the current regimes? And absent great power consensus, how can nuclear weapon states promote and strengthen the regime?

**[00:10:46] Speaker 5:** Thank you very much. First of all, thank you very much for having me today. The topic of this panel is so important, I think. And just for you to know, I'm working now as an academia at Nagasaki University in Japan. But before I became academia, I've been working as a Japanese diplomat more than 64 years and so on. And my career in this disarmament field started in 2002, where North Korea announced withdrawal from the NPT and Iranian clandestine nuclear activity was revealed. And in 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq. And so your question, I do not answer to your question directly now, but before that, I just wanted to say, I mentioned that this consensus is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve. However, it has already started in 2000, where I also started my career. And like Iranian nuclear issue, it was so difficult to have a consensus to report the issue to the UN Security Council in 2005 because there is no consensus among great power. So we had to wait until the next year, 2006. And yeah, we managed to send the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security Council. But I witnessed how it was difficult. And also after that, before Syria, there was an Indian exemption from the NSG in 2009. That was also very difficult to achieve a consensus. And then 2011, Syrian nuclear issue. Yes, the IAEA adopted a resolution to report the issue to the UN Security Council, but with both, and Russia was against, of course. And the issue was reported to the UN Security Council, but of course, at the UN Security Council, there was no consensus. So it has started already around that time. And I was still a diplomat at the time. And I started to think, you know, what is wrong, what is wrong? And now, after almost 25 years now, no, more than 20 years, we still could not resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, Iranian nuclear issue. So where is the problem? I thought that it is because we are relying on great power's consensus. So then I think what you mentioned, mutual interest. Actually, when I decided, just before I decided to leave the ministry, I made my PhD on the topic about the safeguards, traditional international safeguards, and to complement the traditional international safeguards, mutual safeguards, because mutual interest is very important. And I think this is the solution, because in an international community, we cannot rely on enforcement by the UN Security Council. There are so many evidences that we cannot rely on great power's consensus. So to your question, what the non-nuclear weapon states could do is to explore new complemental safeguards system, which does not rely on great power consensus. Yeah, I stop here. Thank you.

**[00:14:40] Speaker 3:** I think that's what people would call a cliffhanger, a new safeguard, a new comprehensive safeguard system. No doubt that we will go back to that. Yes, please. Dr. Pretorius, you have, among other things, written extensively about how to give shape to a world free of nuclear weapons. And one of the thought-provoking questions that stands out in your published work, I think many here in the room are familiar with it, was the question, should we ditch the NPT, followed by an article I recently read, Ditch the NPT. So in your view, what are the most pressing

challenges facing the NPT in the broader non-proliferation regime? And if indeed we, as an international community, would ditch the NPT, how should we then address the proliferation concerns outside of a treaty framework?

**[00:15:37] Speaker 6:** Thank you so much. Thanks for that question and for having me here. So maybe I should start by putting the ditch the NPT articles in context. Tom Sauer, from the University of Antwerp, and I decided to write a set of three articles, actually. The first was asking the question, should we ditch the NPT, which was in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. And then the second one was in Survival, where you said ditch the NPT. And then the third one was a more theoretical piece in contemporary security policy, which we tried to frame the arguments that we were making in the context of legitimacy. And we got a lot of flack from both sides, both the hawks and the doves. And we were accused of being woefully irresponsible, of being for proliferation. But that was never our intention. What we were trying to hit home was that the NPT is blocking movement on disarmament. And that's why we wanted to critique this holy cow. But the NPT is not... It cannot be an end in itself. I mean, the NPT, if we just do the thought process, if it runs to its complete conclusion, must come to an end at some point, because Article 6 talks about disarmament. So what we felt at that time, it was 50 years after the NPT entered into force. When was disarmament going to happen? So maybe it's time to rethink the NPT. And it can't be renegotiated, it can't be reformed. The only alternative, since it was indefinitely extended, was to get rid of it. For states to either withdraw and it would collapse, or to replace it with something else. And in a way, even though especially my own country's diplomats aren't very happy with me, in a way I think that exit symbolically happened already when countries decided to go the TPNW route. They took disarmament and said, we can't have it in the NPT form, so let's do it outside. And yes, they tried to, at great lengths, forge this link, this compatibility, between the NPT and the TPNW. And I agree, the NPT is a stepping stone, but at some point we have to move on from it. And that could be the TPNW, it could be a new agreement, it could be a convention. Unfortunately, the nuclear weapons states is not part of the TPNW, so we're probably looking at a new convention. So the second question that you ask is, well, what if the NPT comes to an end? What about proliferation concerns? So I think one of the important things is, what is a proliferation concern? It is not another country. And that's what the TPNW makes clear, it's another nuclear weapon. Whether that is a nuclear weapon in a nuclear weapon state's arsenal, or whether it's a nuclear weapon in Iran's arsenal. And I'm glad that you mentioned the vertical and the horizontal, but that doesn't come across in the NPT forum. The disarmament debate is discussed outside. I mean, there was this exchange in Vienna between Ambassador Clement, Ambassador Holgate, where she just, when he said, well, the nuclear weapons states keeps on blocking everything in the NPT when we put disarmament things on the table. And she said, disarmament is not to be discussed in the NPT. That's our prerogative. We discuss it, the nuclear weapons states, outside. And then we bring it to the NPT, a done deal. So what can we do if the NPT collapses? There's a safeguard system. Laura Rockwood wrote in a definitive piece on the legal framework of safeguards that the safeguard system of the IAEA is actually the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime. So we have that system in place. States sign safeguards agreements not with the NPT, they sign it with the IAEA. We have the TPNW, 90 states are signatories. Then there's the nuclear weapon free zones. So in all these other legal... The nuclear suppliers group. So there are a whole network of other legal instruments that cater for proliferation concerns. Thank you.

**[00:21:09] Speaker 3:** Thank you very much. Dr Hikawa?

**[00:21:11] Speaker 5:** Yes. Yes, thank you. Thank you for your remarks. Because I'm a big supporter of NPT, I have to comment. You know, recently I discussed with my former colleague about the NPT, what is the significance of the NPT. He said, you know, the NPT's role or the significance of the NPT is that it prevented Japan and West Germany to acquire nuclear weapons. It's a nonproliferation treaty. And, you know, looking back at the history, how the NPT is formulated or negotiated is that... I'm sure you know very well, but the world at that time, you know, after the end of the Second World War, at that time, 1945, 1946, only the United States had nuclear weapons. And, of course, all the other countries, including the Soviet Union at that time, proposed to the United States to abandon nuclear weapons. But the United States, on the other hand, they proposed not to abandon nuclear weapons first, but first establish a control system to verify. It's a safeguard system to verify that we can successfully verify the abolition of nuclear weapons. So the control is first. That was their proposal. But Russia, of course, insisted no, elimination of nuclear weapons should come first. So there was no agreement among the two countries. And they discussed it at the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. No consensus and no achievement. And, yeah, I skip all this history. But it took long years, you know, to convince the United States, at that time, only one country who had nuclear weapons, to abandon nuclear weapons. And, you know, now, in this time, you know, we have nine nuclear-armed states. How we can convince these nine nuclear-armed states to abandon their nuclear weapons? We could not, the international community, could not persuade one single country in, how many years, 80 years ago, 80 years ago, no? So that's why the NBT was proposed, because people wanted to stop other countries acquiring nuclear weapons. So it has a long history, negotiation history, and it is a reality. So the NBT succeeded to prevent more than 180 countries, states, to acquire nuclear weapons. It's a great achievement, I think. So I don't think that we should not underestimate the role of the NBT first, and the safeguards system. The safeguards system is effective for most of the countries. But, like someone mentioned in the, I think, session yesterday, if a country intends to acquire nuclear weapons, the current IAEA safeguards system is very weak, such as North Korea, Iran. We have evidence. So that's why I'm proposing a complemental safeguards system. The IAEA safeguards system is fine for most countries, but if there are countries who have strong intention to acquire nuclear weapons, IAEA safeguards is not strong enough.

**[00:25:06] Speaker 3:** Thank you so much. Wanted to respond?

**[00:25:09] Speaker 4:** Yes. Thank you so much, both of you. It's so interesting to hear these perspectives. With respect to the NPT, I am a person who doesn't think that we should ditch the NPT, but I completely understand all the frustrations that states have with sort of the dysfunction within the treaty, the sort of lack of credibility within the grand bargain. And so I think my question would be a little bit, you know, perhaps different. If you were to ditch the NPT, if you were to live in a world with no NPT, my suspicion is that that would sort of deeply challenge the nonproliferation norm in some ways that these other parts of the regime could not compensate for, because that's really the only place where states' parties come together on a regular basis and at least demonstrate that they believe a world with more nuclear weapons in it is not actually a better world. And I'm not sure that these other sort of agreements that are mostly built on the scaffolding of the NPT, Zanger Committee, et cetera, et cetera, you know, do that in quite the same way. And I'm not sure that

safeguards, even though they precede, the IAEA preceded the NPT, does that either. So I would be a little bit curious to hear about sort of how you feel that that would affect the norm. And second of all, as I alluded to in my opening comments, at this current moment in U.S.-Russian relations and arguably U.S.-Chinese relations, et cetera, there aren't very many fora where those two countries have opportunities to interact with one another. And so sort of entirely separate from maybe what the objective of the treaty is, it strikes me that if we were to lose that treaty, we would lose a really important forum for that kind of interaction, taking into full account what you say, which is that the arms control agreements are actually negotiated outside of the treaty. So I guess I would be curious to hear whether you think the changing geopolitical context affects your argument in any way, because it strikes me that sometimes the NPT is more or less necessary for reasons that are not completely related to nonproliferation.

**[00:27:10] Speaker 6:** Yes, so a number of questions. I think we need to understand the relationship between nonproliferation and disarmament. Or let me say it differently. We need to understand the relationship between proliferation and possession. So why do countries have nuclear weapons? Why do they acquire it? Because others have them. So if the NPT is not going to move on disarmament, then how is it that the nonproliferation aspect of it is not sustainable? Let's take the case of Iran. We cannot think about Iran as a proliferation concern without thinking of Israel's nuclear weapons. The NPT does nothing about that. It's not mentioned in all of these panels. That's been on Iran. It's the elephant in the room. That's not being mentioned. There's an excellent article in the Bulletin by Leonard Weiss and Victor Galinsky on how the U.S. has been silent about Israel's nuclear weapons. So I agree with you that the NPT serves as a forum. But I don't think, given the structural hierarchy that's embedded in it, I'm wondering if the trade-off is not by staying in and by performing this endorsement of the NPT and endorsing the hierarchy, the continued possession, and the narrative that's put out by the nuclear weapons states that we actually have the right, because the NPT legally gives us the right to have these nuclear weapons and we can have it indefinitely. We can use that loophole. So when you ask me, sorry, I didn't answer that question, but you ask me, what is the biggest challenge for the NPT? The biggest challenge, in my opinion, is to get a date for disarmament. Once we close that loophole, things can move. This might sound like pie in the sky, we're never going to get it, but unless you imagine it, and you can imagine it in 30 years, the TPNW said in 10 years, but once you imagine it, you can start working towards it. So I don't know if that answers your question. The other issue, just on being a forum, I believe at the last review conference, Russia sent a very low-level delegation, so there wasn't really room for engaging. And again, that engagement for the nuclear weapons states usually happens outside. We're thinking about this new START treaty. I think that's where the engagement is really going to take place.

**[00:30:45] Speaker 3:** Maybe if I can try to bridge between the two, would there be something that we can think of together with all the bright people we have here, but also the coming weeks, coming months? If I listen to both, there is a genuine desire by non-nuclear weapon states to get further on the disarmament. So one step further than non-proliferation, but to get to disarmament. There, the Article 6. You're correct. There needs to be, if we want to have any further steps, there needs to be a common interest. Is there something that we could think of as third countries, as non-nuclear weapon states, which could be of interest to the nuclear weapon states

on the one hand, and at the same time try to bridge this gap, which I think is increasing every year. Every prepcom, every revcom. The gap seems to be larger between what the common interest is by the P5 or the N5, and the other rest of the community.

**[00:32:02] Speaker 5:** May I?

**[00:32:04] Speaker 3:** Yes, please, and then I'll go back to you.

**[00:32:06] Speaker 5:** Then I'll go to the questions. Yes, I understand the frustration of people about the less progress in the framework of the NPT with regard to disarmament. I understand that, and I understand that this is exactly the reason why people moved to TPNW and supported TPNW. However, NPT, the Article 6, is not only the nuclear weapon states' obligation. The Article 6 reads that each state parties, so each state parties, including non-nuclear weapon states, has the obligation of disarmament, and not only nuclear disarmament, but general and complete disarmament. Because without general and complete disarmament, without thinking of conventional weapons, we cannot achieve nuclear disarmament. And that obligation, all the non-nuclear weapon states' parties to the NPT have this obligation. So why we cannot work on disarmament within the NPT? This is what I'm always saying. Why do we need to have another international legal instrument, like TPNW? We can work, but I understand your point that this hubs and hub-nots, this inequality, I understand, but still, as an institution or as a framework, we can work within the NPT. And of course, I understand it's now very difficult to reach an agreement within the NPT, but it's not only in the NPT. Everywhere else, the other forum, climate change, or the human rights issues, the world is changing. The world is becoming more diverse. So if we cannot reach an agreement in the NPT, the final document is not so important for me. It's better to have nothing if we have a weak agreement. So as you said, we can talk bilaterally, for example, for mutual interest, or regionally. NPT is just a cornerstone. Yeah, we call it cornerstone. We can establish each regional approach or other forum on this cornerstone.

**[00:34:41] Speaker 3:** Thank you. Dr. Begun?

**[00:34:43] Speaker 4:** Yeah, I think this has been such an interesting conversation because I think we all agree that there are these totally legitimate frustrations within the NPT and that there is this common objective to get to a world free of nuclear weapons that's enshrined in the treaty, and it's just a matter of how you do it. One of the things I've been very interested in in my own scholarship is sort of what drives proliferation, what drives innovation in a military context. And when I was listening to the comments, it strikes me that one of the things that makes a country want to acquire nuclear weapons, yes, is the fact that others have them, but it's also the fear that other countries are going to get them. So you started your comments talking about the United States being the lone hegemon in 1945. That was clearly driven by something than other countries having nuclear weapons. It was driven by a fear of Germany acquiring nuclear weapons. And so to me, that's part of what the NPT does is it marries the disarmament and the nonproliferation pillars because if you simply separate out the disarmament part, you will still be left with the fear that other countries could acquire nuclear weapons even if they don't have them yet. And so that strikes me, that mutually reinforcing relationship is something that I think is so unique about the NPT and seems really important. To get to the question of how to sort of bridge the gap, though, I do think there are these shared interest areas

beyond just sort of saying we want time-bound commitments, we don't want to make time-bound commitments. And one of the places where I think more engagement could perhaps be possible between nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states is around these emerging dual-use technologies of concern. So not just focusing on sort of how do you prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons and how do you lead to disarmament there, but how do you think about ways to control technologies that could be used for nuclear purposes but also have civil applications as well that aren't just nuclear? And how do you think about ways to prevent AI from being used in nefarious ways and command and control and things like that? So I do think that there are these places where, because they're dual-use, the nuclear weapon states and the nonnuclear weapon states could potentially share some interests there, but it is the trickiest challenge is how to bring in service of the fulfillment of Article 6 where everybody is obligated to participate in that. How do you do that when you're also faced with this tension of fulfilling Article 2 and not transferring nuclear technology or providing nuclear information to nonnuclear weapon states? And it is just really difficult.

**[00:37:08] Speaker 6:** But Sarah, don't you think that your proposal to talk about dual-use technology and additional controls on it, there are so many controls. Have you seen the trigger lists of the NSG? Our regulatory officials, it is so complicated. So there's already so many controls that the nonnuclear weapon states have to abide by. I don't think that that conversation is going to fly in the NPT.

**[00:37:44] Speaker 4:** Because it just won't satisfy this interest in sort of being more and seeing more progress on this armament.

**[00:37:50] Speaker 6:** What it will mean is that, oh, so additional responsibilities on us to show that we're not going to get nuclear weapons. But what about you? In the same sense, we have the India deal. So, okay, it's okay if you share with other countries. It's your allies. So I don't think that that's the solution. It won't satisfy. And also in yesterday's panel, somebody said, well, if you want to revitalize the NPT, we should, in my view, they say dangle the carrot of nuclear technology. That's bribery. So just turn a blind eye to our disarmament obligations that we're not fulfilling, and we'll give you some extra leeway on the nuclear technology stuff. I don't think that's the way to go.

**[00:38:56] Speaker 3:** In light of time, we still have time, but I've got a lot of questions, and I would also pay attention to the questions from the room. I have three questions which go sort of in a similar direction. One is somehow related to extended deterrence or the fact that the idea that countries have, states have, that in the end you need a nuclear weapon to have an ultimate security. So there's a question by Stephen Young, by Elaine Grossman, and by Jamie Kwong who all relate a bit to how is it possible and how can we come past this point if we wish to do so, if the great powers wish to do so, if the others wish to do so, of this idea of the necessity of a nuclear weapon for your own security, on the one hand, but also the consequences of friendly proliferation, so to say. So what are your perspectives on that for the coming period? What do you see happening in the world, and what should our response be to that? What should be the consequences, what will be the consequences for the NPT, and what should our response be?

**[00:40:21] Speaker 4:** Should I start?

**[00:40:22] Speaker 3:** Please, yeah.

**[00:40:23] Speaker 4:** It has been very interesting to look at this sort of discourse in the bigger nonproliferation space where you now have countries that foreswore nuclear weapons a long time ago, Germany, South Korea, etc., saying we are now thinking about acquiring our own nuclear capability, and specifically citing the sort of lack of credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent as a reason for that. And of course we can't read, you know, we don't know what's in the minds of decision makers, and the people who are proposing that could be folks who are sort of, have been interested in acquiring nuclear weapons for a long time for whatever reason, and now see this as a target of opportunity to promote those arguments more effectively. That could certainly be a thing that's happening. But at least rhetorically they're citing this lack of credibility in the U.S. extended deterrent. And to me that strikes me as a real challenge for all of us in this room is to think, and this harkens back to something we heard yesterday, you know, if an extended deterrent is in fact a nonproliferation tool, which is certainly how the United States thought about it when it was forward-deploying capabilities during the negotiation of the NPT, then how do you ever get to a place, you know, where you don't have to have nuclear weapons for the purposes of an extended deterrent? And I think, you know, there are ways that you could think about building up different conventional capabilities that could perhaps substitute for some of those nuclear capabilities, but there is something in the cachet of nuclear weapons that I think states find very compelling, and they want that for their own security. So my thought would be, you know, think about what nuclear weapons are actually doing in a tactical and strategic way. Think about whether or not you can develop conventional capabilities, high precision, et cetera, et cetera, that fulfill some of those same military objectives, and then see if you can wean people off the reliance on nuclear weapons as a way of sort of eliminating that and moving towards global zero. But it is a really sticky wicket, and I think that's going to be one of the big challenges for our community in the coming years.

**[00:42:18] Speaker 5:** Thank you. Yes, actually about this topic, I wrote—we wrote a book in Japanese, and it was published in December last year, I think. The title, if I translate it into English, is Designing a New Era Without Nuclear Weapons, and we are trying to bring an idea of how we can assure security without nuclear weapons. And it's a difficult topic, a very difficult topic. But we provided some ideas, and especially because I actually left the ministry because, you know, maybe there are also some government officials. As government officials, we have to think about, you know, two months later, or what do we, again, achieve at the conference, in the PTOF conference and so on. We can do that. It's, you know, it's exciting. It's very exciting, and it's very important. And like, you know, my former colleagues in the ministry back in Tokyo, they are thinking—they are working on how to mitigate the threat from North Korea's missile attack. It's a very important issue. They have to work on it hard. But I wanted to work more on long-term perspective issues, which is, you know, the word without nuclear weapons, how we can achieve security, assure security without nuclear weapons. Sorry, I do not want to talk too much. But anyway, there is one book in Japanese. I hope that we can make a kind of English summary. And also, we—Darekuna, the institute I belong to, published a policy paper last year. It's in English, and it's about the sustainability of deterrence policy. And I proposed there a little bit a kind of—for you, maybe, it sounds like a dream, but that word, where we do not need to rely on nuclear weapons. Can I stop here?

**[00:44:32] Speaker 3:** You wish to respond?

**[00:44:34] Speaker 6:** Yes, I think the extended deterrence is really a problem the non-aligned movement raised it long ago in the NPT, and it was raised by Russia as well. So even though, at that point, when the NPT started, I think Russia agreed to that arrangement because they did not want Germany to have nuclear weapons. Times moved on, and at some point, I think it would have been a good idea to end those relationships. I think there's a—the fear experienced now in Europe that's triggering this talk of nuclear weapons, in my opinion, is not about—it's about the use of force. And that really is when we talk about great power consensus, where I see the problem that there's no great power consensus around the use of force, around the UN Charter that bans it. And I don't think that the relative peace that we've had amongst great powers has been the result of nuclear weapons. It's been the result of a consensus around the use of force in the UN Charter and the importance of not engaging in a big war. Nuclear weapons, in my opinion, works against that. We've seen it in the Ukraine war. If we do a little bit of a different analysis, why did Russia think it could wage a war of aggression, which is illegal, against Ukraine? Because they have nuclear weapons. NATO will not react to that because we can deter them. And then you have the U.S. going in, and I think the calculation was, and there's some statements that were made, that we'll go in, we'll support, it can be a war of attrition, the Russian military will deteriorate, eventually there will be regime change in Russia. They won't—we can do this because we have nuclear weapons. So the war sustained. What is being deterred here? I'm always wondering when we talk about nuclear deterrence, is it deterring nuclear attack or is it deterring something else? What is it that states want to deter? Are there other ways to deal with this dynamic that doesn't spiral into the other side of things, where we actually have conventional wars because of the introduction of nuclear weapons in a situation like that?

**[00:47:41] Speaker 3:** Well, I think the last sentence is part of the answer to your question as well as what Dr. Bidgood said about the increase in conventional systems and to be able to better work and better have moments in communication in the escalation potential, not to get to the use of nuclear weapons in the end. Maybe an interesting bridge to what you said is a question by Esther Castain. As a good phase step to revitalize global nonproliferation consensus, could strategizing for bilateral and multilateral no-first-use agreements be strengthened by an inclusion of IAEA in setting verification agreements upon conditions such as the status of strategic and technical nuclear weapons? I think there are two questions in this. One is no-first-use. It's the other elephant in the room, if you allow me, and the second part would be also the link to the role of the IAEA in verification, which it doesn't have at the moment.

**[00:48:55] Speaker 6:** So I think no-first-use... I'm a bit ambivalent about no-first-use because it still is not disarmament. It's still, we'll just keep it, but we won't use it. So it's still there. Accidents can still happen. There can still be miscalculation. So sometimes a good intention leads to an unsustainable situation. I would think that something like negative security assurances could be looked into by the nuclear weapons states if they want to start a bridge. And let's not forget that India did not join the NPT. One of the reasons was we didn't get our negative security assurances. That's a huge problem that a nuclear weapons state can attack and threaten with nuclear weapons, a non-nuclear weapons state. I mean, that's just the basis for proliferation there.

**[00:50:07] Speaker 4:** I totally agree that I think negative security assurances could be really helpful. I just wonder about, I think states have so many doubts about the credibility of those negative security assurances right now that I'm a little skeptical that that would satisfy a country right now. I mean, maybe if things were different, maybe if the war in Ukraine hadn't happened, etc., etc. But I do wonder a little bit if that would not satisfy states today. And I think that's a real challenge for that, even though I think in theory that should be a good solution.

**[00:50:41] Speaker 5:** I totally agree with you. And especially after the invasion of Ukraine, Russia, all these, you know, some kind of agreements or memorandum, the credibility is really in question. So that's why I really think that apart from this legal agreement, we can have somehow mutual interest. If we can find mutual interest, then to be sustainable. And actually that is what I'm proposing in my policy paper, and that is to work on common good. It's not only mutual, but common good. And to change the society and especially economic system for the common good. That is proposed in my paper.

**[00:51:31] Speaker 3:** I would like to go to a question which was already sort of raised in some of the initial statements. If I take two questions together, one from Kelsey Davenport and one from Sophie Boutit, and I apologize if I mispronounce your name, which is both on the consensus that did exist at the moment on the use of certain instruments to convince, try to convince countries not to proliferate. Kelsey Davenport mentions statecraft as a broader sense. Sophie, more on the issue of sanctions. We've seen it did work to a certain extent, but not really. What kind of incentives or disincentives would you think are most impactful in controlling proliferation?

**[00:52:35] Speaker 5:** On this topic, I'm always saying to think about extrinsic motifs and intrinsic motifs. And sanctions are all somehow to enforce from outside. But if the motivation is coming from their own, not control, but they really want to have, it's not because it is control, it is banned, but if, for example, Japan. If Japan believes that it is not to their benefit, interest to have a nuclear weapon, then Japan will never go nuclear. It's not because there is an international legally binding instrument or control. That kind of intrinsic motivation is very important. And what can consist of intrinsic motivation is it can differ for each country. And when we can identify that kind of intrinsic motivation, then I think it serves non-proliferation.

**[00:53:42] Speaker 6:** So I think what is important is that states aren't labeled proliferation concerns, certain states. Because if we look at Iran, I mean, we have to put ourselves in Iran's shoes to understand their security situation at the moment. And that's not being done because Iran is a bad country. It's an enemy. So it's seen from that perspective. So unless we can think about the security situation of a country, understand it, try to understand it, I think that's one way. The second way, and I hate to hammer this situation or this point, is there's some wonderful work in critical security studies by Shampa Biswas where she coins this term of nuclear desire. If there is a small club that gets a lot of benefit from having something, this exclusive product, which others can't have, it creates a psychological sense of we want this too. We want the seat on the UN Security Council, the permanent seat. So we have to break that club in some way to get rid of that psychological imperative, that nuclear desire. I also think just from my own country that had nuclear weapons, that gave them up, there is, of course, internal issues at stake. And if you have internal transformation, it's not easy being hated by the rest of the world. So

sanctions matter. Isolation matters because people want to travel. They want to invest in other countries. They want to have businesses. They're part of this bigger world. So I think that that's really something in the South African case that mattered, and you can read the history up on that. So internal change, and this is what you were saying about intrinsic, that is an important factor as well.

**[00:56:24] Speaker 4:** Yeah, I would agree with that. I think this concept of sort of strategically empathic approaches to nonproliferation is something that's probably missing from some of the more blunt instruments that we tend to use. And understanding what it is that is motivating a country's interest in nuclear weapons should then determine what strategies you use to dissuade them from doing that. But I'm thinking about your comment about the timelines that government officials are working on, where maybe you're thinking two months out. Maybe you're thinking about what's going to happen next week. And I understand that these are the kinds of issues that really require sort of a deep analysis and an ability to do that sort of in-depth work, and sometimes that's incompatible with an issue that is in your face and on fire right now. And so I do think, I mean, this is not the question that was being asked, but this is a place where academics and policy communities really come together because I think the folks who have the space and the latitude to do that kind of strategically empathic work should be feeding that into the policy process and finding ways to interact. They're more in service of coming up with more effective approaches here.

**[00:57:32] Speaker 3:** Maybe the first but one last question. I just wanted to raise one which also connects to what you said about you have to break it apart and you have to. By Safa Koldi, and again, apologies for mispronouncing, what comes after disarmament might be a barrier to work towards disarmament. What comes after accomplishing a world with no nuclear weapons, and some will lose their bargaining chips and others will lose security. These are real concerns. I just wanted to flag this one relating to the opening that you offered.

**[00:58:10] Speaker 6:** Yes. So, again, we have to take that and look at the trade-offs. Are we happy living in this world where accidents can happen, where the planet can be destroyed, where there can be a nuclear war? Or can we think of different ways to go about this? And I go back to my sense, and I'm not the person. It's actually Una Attaway and Shapiro who wrote the book The Internationalists that I found very inspiring, where they said if we start with the European pact and then look at the UN Charter and the use of force against that, that was powerful. People don't want war. So I think we have to vote for peace. It's, you know, si vis pacem, para pacem. If you want peace, prepare for peace, don't prepare for war.

**[00:59:19] Speaker 3:** I'm going to park that one for lunch. Perhaps one last question in the two and a half minutes that we have. It's an easy one, but I would like to try to end with something positive. Question by Matthew Bunn. What kinds of cooperation between the U.S., China, and Russia that promote nuclear proliferation might politically be plausible over the next few years? And then we go to lunch.

**[00:59:48] Speaker 4:** Thanks, Matt. Yeah, that is an easy question. You know, I was thinking about this in preparing for today, and it's really hard to come up with issues where it seems like there is mutual interest, in part because I would say Russia certainly, but the United States as well, increasingly, are sort of coming up with a negative agenda rather than a positive agenda of things that can be done, and

that makes it really tough, particularly if you're looking from the outside in to sort of read through declaratory policy, et cetera, et cetera, and identify these points of interest. But the two that I came up with conceivably are developing a security culture around next generation nuclear technologies. So Russia and the United States are both pursuing SMRs. They both have this incredibly extensive experience building security culture with one another. Is that a place where they could work constructively together if there is political will to do that? I think conceivably that's something. And then also getting back to this idea of sort of ways to devise an export control regime that is more stringent and able to address things like additive technologies and additive manufacturing, things like this, these challenges that are coming up that have real proliferation implications. I think that's a place where the U.S. and Russia certainly could conceivably work together, but again, it's not going to happen if there's no political will.

**[01:01:05] Speaker 3:** Dr. Ikawa, final words.

**[01:01:08] Speaker 5:** I just, you know, yeah, in one sentence, stop blaming game.

**[01:01:14] Speaker 3:** Very brief. Dr. Pretorius.

**[01:01:17] Speaker 6:** I think there's a lot to be done amongst those three countries, and there are scenarios in which the three of them can get together, and I would say the one to explore is how do you bring the U.S. and Russia's nuclear weapons down to a point where China says, yes, now we can negotiate.

**[01:01:39] Speaker 3:** Thank you so much. Before we go to lunch, I was requested to ask you kindly to immediately go to the other side. I would like to ask you a round of applause for the three panelists and the very good discussion. Thank you.